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Abstract 
There is much debate on the impact of product and process standards on trade. The conceptual 
arguments are complex and empirical evidence is mixed. We analyze the impact of standards 
and tariffs on the dramatic rise and fall of the raisin trade between France and Greece in the 
course of 25 years at the end of the 19th century. The case illustrates how product standards can 
be used to address consumer concerns and to protect producer interests. Economic conditions 
and French policies first stimulated Greek raisin imports. Later, changing conditions and 
political pressures led to the introduction of tariffs and wine standards which caused major 
declines in Greek exports and ultimately the bankruptcy of the Greek economy. Interestingly, 
this trade episode of more than a century ago still has a regulatory legacy in today’s EU wine 
regulations. 
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1. Introduction 
Adulterations and frauds have existed as long as products have been exchanged and traded. The 
addition of water in wine or in milk to increase the volume has been documented throughout 
history and across the globe. Standards to prevent fraud have been introduced by governments, 
religious authorities, private agents and NGOs.  
In recent years, standards have increased rapidly, both geographically and in addressing 
new concerns. Production and trade are increasingly regulated through stringent public and 
private standards on quality, safety, environmental, and ethical aspects. An illustration of the 
rapid increase in public food standards is the number of notifications of new SPS measures to 
the WTO. These have increased exponentially from a few hundred in the mid-1990s to more 
than 15,000 (Maertens and Swinnen, 2014). Private standards are often more stringent than 
public ones (Fulponi, 2007; Vandemoortele and Deconinck, 2014).  
The rise and spread of standards has triggered vigorous debates on the impacts on 
international trade.1 The literature identifies two characteristics of standards which affect trade. 
On the one hand, they can be trade facilitating by reducing transaction and information costs. 
On the other hand, they can be trade constraining: many trade economists consider them as non-
tariff barriers to trade. As international trade agreements such as the WTO have contributed to 
a global reduction in tariffs, it is often argued that countries have turned to standards as new 
instruments to shield their domestic markets from foreign competition (see arguments in e.g., 
Anderson et al., 2004; Beghin et al., 2012; Fischer and Serra, 2000; Marette and Beghin, 2010; 
Van Tongeren et al., 2009).  
                                                          
1 There is another major debate in the development literature. The debate is whether developing countries and the 
poor can comply with the standards and, if not, whether this is leading to the exclusion of small and weakly 
capitalized producers from these “high standard value chains” and, for those who can participate, whether they are 
hurt by rent extraction through superior bargaining power of increasingly concentrated downstream agents, or 
whether they may benefit from institutional innovations in the value chains (see arguments in e.g., Dries et al., 
2009; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Minten et al., 2009; Reardon et al., 2003, 2009; Swinnen, 2007, 2016). 
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However, the implicit comparison with tariffs in the trade debate is not entirely valid. 
In a small open economy, the socially optimal tariff level is zero. A positive tariff level 
constrains trade, is harmful to social welfare, and is by definition protectionist. However, this 
is not necessarily the case for standards since this ignores the potential consumer or societal 
benefits induced by standards. Standards can generate efficiency gains by solving (or reducing) 
externalities or asymmetric information problems and reduce transaction costs, but they also 
involve implementation costs and affect trade. Models which include both negative and positive 
aspects of the standards yield nuanced/complex theoretical conclusions, and that careful 
empirical analyses support such nuanced arguments and complex effects (Beghin et al., 2015; 
Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 2011; Swinnen et al., 2015).2 The simple “standards as 
protectionism” arguments ignore the social benefits of standards in terms of consumer welfare, 
for example by reducing asymmetric information, and in terms of reducing externalities in 
society. Including these other effects of standards makes the impact of standards on trade and 
welfare less obvious: the direction and magnitude of effects on trade are sector specific and 
specific for different standards (Marette and Beghin; 2010; Sheldon, 2012; Van Tongeren et 
al., 2009; Xiong and Beghin, 2014).  
However, at the same time, one should not ignore that standards do create winners and 
losers in society as its effects can differ for consumers and producers, and within consumer and 
producer groups. This does induce lobbying by firms and consumer groups, including 
protectionist pressures, which may lead to suboptimal standards (Swinnen and Vandemoortele, 
2008, 2011). 
The complexity and nuances of these conceptual arguments are mirrored in difficulties 
in the empirical measurement. The informational requirements are huge: one needs reliable 
                                                          
2 See also the special issues of the World Trade Review (guest edited by Heckelei and Swinnen in 2012) and the 
World Economy (guest edited by Beghin and Orden in 2012) and Beghin et al. (2015) for reviews.  
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estimates of fixed and variable costs for heterogeneous firms and valuation of external effects 
by consumers. Moreover, the policy instruments involved are often dissimilar and difficult to 
aggregate; data are scarce for effects of public regulations and almost inexistent for private 
standards (Baldwin, 2000; Marette, 2014). Li and Beghin (2014) conclude that sorting out the 
protectionism of standards is complex once one moves beyond simple detection strategies. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, in a review of the literature, Beghin et al. (2015) conclude that there 
is a wide variety of results of empirical studies, with some finding anti-trade, others pro-trade 
and yet others no effect on trade. 
In this paper we use a different approach. We focus on a specific historical case where 
both tariff and standards were introduced. We explicitly link the introduction of the standards 
to pressures of lobby groups. We also document how they relate to import tariffs and other 
policies—and discuss their effects. 
We believe the case is a useful addition to this literature because the forces behind the 
introduction of standards, and their effects, were quite dramatic. Both the rise and fall of the 
raisin trade between France and Greece in the course of 25 years at the end of the 19th century 
were equally spectacular, as illustrated in Figure 1. The case provides an amazing example of 
how major changes in trade can be caused by environmental shocks and government policies, 
including standards, and of its important implications for trade, economic growth and decline.  
It also provides an illustration of how standards can be used to address consumer concerns and 
to protect producer interests, or both.  
Throughout history, governments have often used a combination of different policy 
instruments, including tariffs and non-tariff barriers to affect trade and protect domestic 
industries and European agricultural policies are a prime example of this (Anderson et al., 2013; 
Swinnen, 2009; Tracy, 1989). The European wine sector is a particularly interesting sector to 
study the use of standards as non-tariff instruments because they have been so pervasive, 
5 
 
particularly in countries where the wine sector and trade was a very important sector for the 
economy (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013).   
Greece was arguably the first global wine power house, dominating wine production 
and trade in the last millennium AD (McGovern, 2007; Unwin, 1991). However, by the mid-
19th century this was (literally) ancient history. Greece had fallen from a mighty empire to a 
small and agricultural economy, cultivating cereals, vines, and olives. The global wine business 
was dominated by France (Francis, 1972; Lampe, 1975; Rose, 2011).3  
However, all this was about to change with the arrival of an unexpected—and 
unwelcome—guest in France: a small insect called Phylloxera. In the second half of the 19th 
century, Phylloxera arrived in France from its home in North America and it will devastate 
French vineyards in the decades after. This devastation transforms the entire wine industry and 
trade around the Mediterranean (Meloni and Swinnen, 2016a).  
A major consequence was the rapid growth of vineyards in Greece. Greece started to 
massively plant vineyards in the Peloponnese (a region in Southern Greece) in order to export 
raisins and meet French demand for grapes and wine. Raisin exports tripled between 1870 and 
1890, with most of the export growth going to France. Raisins became the main export revenue 
for Greece and an important tax source for the government budget. 
However, the good times do not last. When France finally finds a way to deal with the 
infestation, its domestic grape production recovers, and, under pressure from its wine growers, 
it forbids the use of Greek raisins to make French wine, it raises import tariffs on raisins and 
defines wine as “the alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes”. The new French regulations 
                                                          
3 Since the Middle Ages, France has been dominating wine trade from its harbors on the Atlantic coast—first La 
Rochelle and later Bordeaux. Bordeaux exported an annual average of about 790,000 hectoliters to Britain during 
the first 30 years of the 14th century (Francis, 1972, Appendix). 
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contributed to destroy the raisin trade. Moreover, they ultimately lead to the bankruptcy of the 
Greek government.4  
In this paper we document in detail these remarkable developments and its causes.  
Section 2 describes the rise of the raisin production and trade in Greece. Section 3 examines 
how French vineyards were reconstructed with new plantings and how, as a result, French 
vineyards began to recover and production increased. Section 4 shows how growing raisin 
imports and the recovery of French wine production caused political pressures on the French 
government to intervene and led to several radical measures to reduce the use of raisins in 
French wine production. As a result, the impressive growth of Greek raisin production and 
exports in the 19th century was followed by an equally spectacular fall. Section 5 analyses how 
these French regulations ultimately led to a national crisis and, ultimately, to the bankruptcy of 
the Greek government. Section 6 shows how, in order to solve the raisin overproduction crisis, 
the Greek government searched for new export markets and tried to regulate the supply of 
raisins in order to stabilize falling prices. Section 7 explains how these French standards that 
contributed to destroy the raisin trade still have a regulatory legacy in today’s EU wine 
regulations. Section 8 concludes. 
 
                                                          
4 Raisins from the US (California) and Turkey are bigger and different from the raisins (‘currants’) produced in 
Greece (which were sweeter and smaller)—and the French preferred the Greek currants (Aroni‐Tsichli, 2014). 
Turkey also experienced a similar path of growth and decline but the impact of French policies were less severe. 
Vineyards in Turkey (then known as Anatolia) existed as early as 4,000 BCE. It is considered one of the birthplaces 
of wine. However, during the Ottoman Empire (1299–1923) wine drinking was banned and only raisin production 
remained (Özdemir, 2013). During the 1880s, French increased demand for raisins also led to increase in vine 
plantings and raisins production, with Turkish raisin production doubling between the early 1870s and mid-1880s. 
Turkey became the world’s largest raisin producer at the end of the 19th century, surpassing Spain. However, this 
changed during the 1890s, when Phylloxera devastated Turkey, and France imposed high tariffs on Turkish raisin 
imports. The crisis was further exacerbated by the rise of California and Australia that were now competing with 
Turkish raisins (Morilla Critz et al., 1999, 2000).  
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2. The Rise of the Raisin Trade 
“Raisin wine is a very healthy drink; It is a hundred times preferable to these synthetic drinks 
that are sold in Paris under the name of wine and which contain chemicals ... It would 
therefore be useful that this industry would develop further in order to counter as much as 
possible the shortages of the production of our natural wines” 
Journal des Chambres de Commerce, 1886 (In: Stanziani, 2003, p. 171) 5 
In 1830, there was little production or export of raisins in Greece. Raisin production took off 
during the 1830s after the War of Greek Independence (1821–1832), fueled by growing British 
demand. Greek raisins were consumed by the British middle class and used in their traditional 
pudding (Progoulakis and Bournova, 2001).6 Until the 1860s, Britain was the principal 
consumer of Greek raisins. But, from the 1870s onwards, new (and unexpected consumers) 
spurred demand for Greek raisins.  
By the mid-19th century, viticulture played a major role in France’s economic 
development. It created income, wealth, and employment for many citizens. However, all this 
changed with the arrival of a devastating insect around 1864. The appearance in France of 
Phylloxera—an insect that originated in North America, lives on the vines’ root systems and 
kills the plant7—ravaged France’s vineyards and caused a collapse in the supply of wine (Augé-
Laribé, 1950; Lachiver, 1988). Unlike American native vine species (e.g., Vitis riparia or Vitis 
rupestris), European vine species (Vitis vinifera) were not resistant to it. The impact was 
dramatic. One-third of the French vine area was destroyed, and the remaining (infected) 
                                                          
5 Translation by the authors. “(…) le vin de raisin sec est une boisson très saine; il est cent fois préférable à ces 
boissons sophistiquées que l’on vend à Paris sous le nom de vin et qui contiennent des préparations chimiques… 
Ce serait donc utile que cette industrie se développe encore afin de parer autant que possible aux insuffisances de 
la production de nos vins naturels” (Stanziani, 2003, p. 171). 
6 By the mid-1960s, vineyards-owners enjoyed a larger return, about 9 drachmas per hectare, compared to the 
cereal-owners, about 2 drachmas per hectare—four to five times more profitable (Progoulakis and Bournova, 
2001). 
7 Unlike American native vine species (e.g., Vitis riparia or Vitis rupestris), European vine species (Vitis vinifera) 
are not resistant to it. Phylloxera spread through much of Europe. First in Portugal and Turkey in 1871, then in 
Austria-Hungary in 1872, in Switzerland in 1873/4, in Spain in 1875, in Italy in 1879, and in Germany in 1881 
(Ordish, 1987; Unwin, 1991, p.284). 
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vineyards produced little wine. As a consequence, French wine production declined by about 
70% in the 1870s and 1880s (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013, 2014). 
While potential cures for Phylloxera were searched and tested, France moved from the 
world’s leading wine exporter to a wine importing country in less than a decade. By 1890, 
average annual production in France had fallen to 30 million hectoliters, while consumption 
remained at about 45 million hectoliters (Statistique Générale de la France, 1891).  
To fill this gap, France followed a strategy with four components (Meloni and Swinnen, 
2016a). First, and most obviously, France searched for ways to make vineyards resistant to 
Phylloxera. Second, it increased wine imports, mostly from Spain and Italy. Third, France 
stimulated wine production in its North African colonies (Algeria and later on Tunisia and 
Morocco). Finally, France also started importing raisins (dried grapes) which were used to 
produce wine in France. 
From the 1870s onwards, France started to import raisins from Greece at fast speed and 
to produce “raisin wines” (wines produced from raisins) out of them (Petmezas, 1997; 
Tsiovaridou, 1980).8 “Raisin wines” were one of the “adulterations” allowed during the late 
19th century. The concept of “adulterated wines” referred both to wines where extra ingredients 
were added which were not harmful to the consumer’s health (as “sugar wines”9 and “grape 
marc wines”10) and wines with harmful ingredients as tartaric acid, citric acid, and sulfuric 
acid.11 The combination of “raisin wines”, “sugar wines” and “grape marc wines” accounted 
                                                          
8 In order to produce one hectoliter of wine, the wine producer needed to ferment about fifteen days in 30-35 
kilograms of raisins mixed in 100 liter of water at 30 degrees (Sempé, 1898, p. 87).  
9 French “sugar wines” were obtained either from the addition of sugar to the wine or from the addition of water 
and sugar to the grape marcs (i,e., the solid remains of grapes after their first pressing). This procedure, also known 
as “chaptalization” named after his inventor the French statesman and chemist Jean-Antoine Chaptal (1756-1832), 
was used to increase the wine alcoholic strength (Chaptal et al., 1801, p. 81). 
10 French “grape marc wines” (or “piquettes”) were obtained from the addition of water (without added sugar nor 
alcohol) to the grape marcs (the solid remains of grapes after their first pressing) (Article 3, JORF, 1897). 
11 A famous 19th century recipe in France gave the quantities needed to produce 6 hectoliters of wine with 100 
kilograms of sugar “Pour a kilogram of tartaric acid, a kilogram of citric acid, and a kilogram of sulfuric acid in 
a barrel. Add a liter or two of cold water to avoid explosion, then put 60 liters of boiling water, stir with a stick 
and throw in 100 kilograms of sugar. Hold in motion by stirring for half an hour. The resulting syrup is ready to 
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for 25% of French wine production in the second half of the 1880s (Bichet, 1934, p. 259; Heath, 
2014, p. 95; Stanziani, 2003, 2004). During that period, French “raisin wines” accounted for 
between 1 and 2 million hectoliters—about 8% of total French wine production (see Figures 1 
and 2 and Table 1). The growth of raisin wine production was mirrored by a spectacular increase 
in raisin imports. French imports of Greek raisins increased from almost nothing in the early 
1870s to about 9,000 tons in 1878, to 30,000 tons four years later (1881) to 71,000 tons in 
1889—representing around 40% of the total Greek raisin exports (see Table 2). Moreover, by 
the end of the 1880s, the main source of the raisins was Greece, which captured 60% of the 
French market, followed by Spain and Turkey (the two other big raisins producers) (see Table 
3). 
The combined growth of British and French demand during the second half of the 19th 
century caused a dramatic growth of raisin production in Greece: from 25,000 tons in 1830 to 
150,000 tons in 1890 (see Figure 3). The increased demand for Greek raisins, coupled with the 
1871 land distribution act,12 led to a large increase in vineyards in Greece, in particular in the 
Peloponnese region in southern Greece (Aroni‐Tsichli, 2014). The cultivated vine area in 
Greece increased almost fourfold: from about 15.000 hectares in the early 1860s to 53,000 
hectares in the late 1880s—with the Peloponnese region increasing its share from 7% to 26% 
over the same period (Franghiadis, 1990, pp. 17/24). Raisin production followed quickly 
thereafter, tripling in two decades from 55,000 tons in 1870 to 150,000 tons in 1890. Raisin 
exports followed the same impressive pace—with almost all of the Greek raisin production 
                                                          
use. (…) The above mixture is used to produce 6 hectoliters of wine (…).” [Translation by the authors. “Dans un 
fût défoncé, mettre un kilo d'acide tartrique, un kilo d'acide citrique, un kilo d'acide sulfurique. Jeter dessus un 
litre ou deux d'eau froide pour éviter l'explosion, puis mettre environ 60 litres d'eau bouillante, agiter avec un 
bâton et jeter dedans 100 kilos de sucre. Tenir le tout en mouvement en agitant pendant une demi-heure. Le sirop 
ainsi obtenu est prêt à employer. (…) Le mélange ci-dessus est bon pour 6 hectolitres de vin (…)”] (In: Napo, 
1971, p. 25). 
12 In 1871, a land-reform program was enforced and more than 250,000 hectares of national lands were 
redistributed among 350,000 families between 1871 and 1911 (Progoulakis and Bournova, 2001; Gallant, 2015). 
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being exported. Their export value increased fourfold, from 20 million drachmas in 1860 to 80 
million drachmas in the late 1880s (see Figure 4).13   
In summary, in the 20-year period between 1870 and 1890, France became a large 
importer of Greek raisins and Greek raisin production and exports grew exponentially. Raisins 
not only became Greece’s principal export (representing about 55% of Greek export value 
during the 1886–90 period) but also the main crop cultivated in Greece (see Table 4 and Figure 
5). 
3. French Vineyard Recovery 
“(…) two important agricultural organizations were created in 1887-1888 (...) to defend their 
particular interests: the Syndicat Général des Sériculteurs (...) and the Syndicat Général des 
Viticulteurs whose constitution marks the conversion of ‘liberal’ winegrowers to 
protectionism, following the phylloxera crisis” 
Barral, 1974, p. 42214 
It took France more than twenty years to understand why vines were dying and to make 
vineyards resistant to Phylloxera. French experts were initially led astray by history. French 
vineyards had been destroyed a few decades earlier by oidium (powdery mildew). From 1847 
to 1854, wine production decreased from 54 million to 11 million hectoliters. The discovery of 
sulfur to tackle the oidium vine disease allowed France to rapidly recover its wine production 
levels, with 54 million hectoliters by 1858 (Insee, 1935). This stimulated winegrowers to fight 
Phylloxera with the same means, but unsuccessfully.15 
                                                          
13 The main export harbor from which raisins were exported was Patras, in the northern Peloponnese region 
(Frangakis-Syrett, 1994; Pizánias, 1992). 
14 “(…) deux secteurs importants du monde agricole mettent sur pied en 1887-1888 (…) pour défendre leur intérêts 
particuliers: le Syndicat Général des Sériculteurs (…) et le Syndicat général des Viticulteurs, dont la constitution 
marque la conversion au protectionnisme des viticulteurs longtemps libre-échangistes, à la suite de la crise du 
phylloxéra” (Barral, 1974, p. 422). 
15 In the search for a cure, two groups of scientists opposed each other diametrically: the “Chemists” and the 
“Americanists”. The first group advocated chemical treatments, and steam engines were adapted to pump 
expensive carbon disulfide into vineyards. The second group claimed that the solution to Phylloxera was, 
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By the 1880s, new types of vines had been developed, using American vines, to resist 
Phylloxera.  During the 1890s, French vineyards were reconstructed with new plantings that 
used grafting and hybrid grape varieties. The first solution—grafting—consisted of attaching 
European vines to the roots of the Phylloxera-resistant American vine species. The second 
solution—hybrids—consisted of crossing two or more varieties of different vine species. 
Hybrids were the result of genetic crosses either between American vine species (“American 
direct-production hybrids”) or between European and American vine species (“French 
hybrids”). As a result, French vineyards began to recover and production increased, and by 
1900 it had reached around 65 million hectoliters, the level of the pre-crisis years (Gale, 2011; 
Paul, 1996). 
Hence, by the beginning of the 20th century, French wine production had recovered. 
This recovery and the increased imports caused a strong fall of wine prices. From the peak in 
1880, average wine prices fell by more than 60% over the course of the next 25 years (Meloni 
and Swinnen, 2014). The most dramatic decline was during the 1890s, when French production 
began to increase. The declining prices resulted in demands by French producers to limit 
imports of wine and raisins. As wine prices continued to fall, the protests by winegrowers grew 
increasingly intense.  
Under pressure from French wine producer organizations, as the Syndicat Général des 
Viticulteurs (General Union of Winemakers), the government introduced a series of laws aimed 
at limiting imports by imposing high tariffs on wine and raisins, regulating wine “quality”16 and 
controlling wine supply (by restricting the total area of land under vines) (Meloni and Swinnen, 
                                                          
paradoxically, its cause. Vineyards could be saved only through the Phylloxera-resistant American vines (Gale, 
2011; Paul, 1996).  
16 At the beginning of the 20th century, several laws defined wine, imposed the notification of annual production 
levels and forbade the addition of water and sugar of wines. Moreover, other laws were introduced linking the 
“quality” of the wine, to its production region (the terroir) and the traditional way of producing wine. The system 
of Appellations d’Origine Contrôlées (AOC) was born (for details see Meloni and Swinnen, 2013). 
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2016a). The increased tariffs on wine and raisins imports had major implications for exporters 
of wine and raisins. The tariffs effectively blocked the imports of Spanish and Italian wines into 
France (Chevet et al., 2017; Fernández and Pinilla, 2017). They also had major implications for 
raisin trade and for Greece. 
4. The Fall of the Raisin Trade 
“It is not only fraud that was removed, but the entire production of wine from dried 
grapes.”17 
Sempé, 1898, p. 102 
The impressive growth of Greek raisin production and exports in the 19th century was followed 
by an equally spectacular fall. In 1889 more than 40% of Greek raisins were exported to France 
(although Britain remained the largest raisin export market for Greece). However, as French 
vineyards and production had recovered and prices fell, French wine and grape producers 
lobbied the government to restrict raisin imports and the use of Greek raisins for French wine 
production. The French government gave in to the pressure and introduced four major 
regulations to reduce the use of raisins in French wine production: (1) it introduced compulsory 
labeling of “raisin wines” to distinguish these from “wine” for consumers, (2) it imposed high 
taxes on “raisin wines” production in France, (3) it imposed high tariffs on Greek raisin imports 
and (4) it forbade adding water to wines. 
First, a 1889 French law (‘Loi Griffe’)18 defined “wine” as a beverage exclusively made 
from the “fermentation of fresh grapes” (see Table 5).19 The result was that wines made from 
                                                          
17 Translation by the authors. “Ce n'est pas la fraude seulement qu'on a supprimée, mais la fabrication même des 
vins de raisins secs” (Sempé, 1898, p. 102). 
18 A month earlier, as a fiscal measure, a new tax was introduced on all wine entering towns (Article 12, JORF, 
1889a). 
19 “No person shall send, sell or offer for sale under the denomination ‘wine’ a product other than the one obtained 
from the fermentation of fresh grapes.” [Translation by the authors. “Nul ne pourra expédier, vendre ou mettre en 
vente sous la simple dénomination de vin un produit autre que celui de la fermentation de raisins frais” (Article 
1, JORF, 1889b).]  
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raisins (dried grapes) could no longer be called “wine” but had to be labelled as “raisin wines”—
which typically sold at a lower price (Article 3, JORF, 1889b).20 Moreover, the barrels 
containing wines made from raisins had to be labelled in large letters “raisin wines” (Article 4, 
JORF, 1889b).21 As a consequence, French demand for raisin imports fell. French imports of 
Greek raisins decreased by more than 30% in a single year: from about 70,000 tons in 1889 to 
45,000 tons in 1890 (Milhau, 1953; Stanziani, 2012, p. 132).  
Second, in 1890, the French government imposed a tax on “raisin wines” production 
(“droit de fabrication”). This wine was subject to a duty of 40 cents per degree of alcohol 
content up to 10%, and 60 cents from 10% to 15%. This meant that producers of a wine with 
an alcohol content of 10% had to pay a production tax of 4 francs per hectoliter of wine. Since 
“raisin wines” were sold on average at 10-12 francs per hectoliter, this implied a 40% tax 
(Article 7, JORF, 1890; Arnauné, 1911, p. 311; Sempé, 1898, p. 146). The tax was further 
increased in 1897 as “raisin wines” were moved from the “wine” tax regime to the “hard 
alcohol” tax regime (Article 1, JORF, 1897).  
Third, in 1892, three years after the ‘Loi Griffe’, France increased tariffs on raisin 
imports. Previously, the tariffs on raisins were set at a fixed rate of 6 francs per 100 kilograms. 
With the “Méline tariff” of 1892, tariffs on raisin imports were increased to 25 francs per 100 
kilograms if the “general tariff” applied and to 15 francs per 100 kilograms if the “minimum 
tariff” applied22—a threefold or fourfold increase (JORF, 1892; Sempé, 1898, p. 100). In 1894, 
the tariffs on raisin imports were further increased from 25 francs per 100 kilograms to 40 if 
                                                          
20 On average, in the mid-1890s, “wines” made from fresh grapes were sold at 26 francs per hectoliter, whereas a 
“raisin wines” were sold at 10-12 francs per hectoliter in the mid-1890s—50% less (Sempé, 1898, p. 146). 
21 The same law established that also the fermentation of grape marc with sugar and water could not be sold as 
“wine” but as “sugar wine” (Article 2, JORF, 1889b). 
22 The “Méline tariff” of 1892 was named after the French statesman, Jules Méline, at that time president of the 
Chamber of Deputies. The “Méline tariff” of 1892 set a double-tariff system, a “general tariff” applied to all the 
countries and a “minimum tariff” applied to countries who gave France correlative advantages in trade, i.e. an 
invitation for bilateral agreements (Barral, 1974; Haight, 1941, p. 66). According to Smith (1992), the Méline tariff 
is “credited with ending France's experiment in free trade and returning the country to a policy of high protection 
(…) it was arguably the most important piece of economic legislation in the history of the Third Republic”. 
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the “general tariff” applied and from 15 francs per 100 kilograms to 25 if the “minimum tariff” 
applied (Sempé, 1898, p. 101).   
Fourth, in 1894, a law forbade the addition of water and alcohol to the wines (Article 1, 
JORF, 1894).23 The ban on the watering down of wines was particularly harmful for “raisin 
wines” as the recipe required the addition of water to the raisins during the winemaking process 
in order to start the fermentation (Simpson, 2011, p. 61; Stanziani, 2003). This law was 
confirmed in 1907 (JORF, 1907a).  
The combined effect of the wine regulations and the increased taxes and tariffs were 
dramatic. Greek raisin exports to France fell from 70,000 tons in 1889 to 45,000 tons in 1890 
and to 14,600 tons in 1893 (Table 2; Morilla Critz et al., 1999; Petmezas, 2000). French 
production of “raisin wines” decreased from 4 million hectoliters (the production peak) to less 
than a million after 1893. It fell further to almost nothing after the beginning of the 20th century 
(see Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1). 
5. The Fall Out 
“Greek people (…) are actually smarting under a financial crisis, the principal cause of 
which is to be traced to over-production of their almost unique article of cultivation—the 
currant.”24 
Gabrielidis, Editor of the ‘Akropolis’ Athens, 1895 
 
                                                          
23 A previous 1891 law had regulated “fraud” by banning some (harmful) additives that were used during 
winemaking. “It is considered an adulteration of food any addition to wine, sugar wine or marc, raisin wine of the 
following elements: 1. any coloring matter; 2. products such as sulfuric, nitric, hydrochloric, salicylic, boric acids; 
3. sodium chloride above 1 gram per liter” [Translation by the authors. “Constitue la falsification des denrées 
alimentaires (…) toute addition au vin, au vin de sucre ou de marc, au vin de raisins secs: 1. de matières colorantes 
quelconques; 2. de produits tels que les acides sulfuriques, nitriques, chlorhydriques, salicyliques, boriques ou 
analogues; 3. de chlorure de sodium au-dessus de 1 gramme par litre.”] (Article 2, JORF, 1891). Moreover, the 
same 1891 law regulated another form of wine adulteration. “Plastering”, or “plâtrage”, an old technique 
discovered by the Ancient Romans, was used to clarify the wine and to improve its color through the addition of 
sulphate of potash or soda. Since these substances were considered harmful, their addition was forbidden beyond 
two grams per liter (Article 3, JORF 1891; Stanziani, 2012, p. 174). 
24 Corinthian raisins (or ‘currants’) are dried small grapes of the Greek variety ‘Black Corinth’ (Aroni‐Tsichli, 
2014). In our analysis we will name them ‘raisins’. 
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Although the measures only directly impacted the Greek producers and traders of raisins, the 
French measures ultimately led to a national crisis. With the domination of raisins in production 
and Greek exports, the Greek economy had become highly dependent on raisin markets 
(Franghiadis, 1990, p. 33; Petrakis and Panorios, 1992). Even if British demand remained 
stable, the fall in French demand caused a raisin overproduction crisis (especially in the 
southern part of the Peloponnese region where raisin cultivation dominated). The impact on the 
Greek raisin market was dramatic. Raisin prices dropped from 0.63 francs per kilograms in 
1890 to 0.09 francs per kilograms in 1893—a 85% decrease (Tsiovaridou, 1980).  
Because of its importance as export revenue (as almost all raisin production was 
exported) there were important macro-economic implications. Foreign debts represented one-
third of the national budget and were partially guaranteed by the revenues from raisin exports. 
The fall in raisin prices and export value contributed thus to a significant decrease in 
government revenues and ultimately to the bankruptcy of the Greek government.25 In 1893, 
Prime Minister Charilaos Trikoupis announced to the parliament the historic words: 
“Regretfully, Gentlemen, we are bankrupt.” (Chiotellis, 2014; Dakin, 1972, p. 147; Gallant, 
2015; Morilla Critz et al. 1999; Pepelasis Minoglou, 1995, p. 257; Stavrianos, 1958, p. 477).26  
6. The Aftermath: Overproduction and Supply Regulations in Greece 
“(…) under the mass pressure from the majority of the currant production areas, the Prime 
Minister Theodoros Deligiannis passed a new law in Parliament, in July 1895. (…) This law 
constituted the first form of implementation of a currant policy on the part of the state, yet 
without being able to definitely solve the currant problem.” 
Aroni‐Tsichli, 2014 
                                                          
25 This was not the first time that a bankruptcy occurred. The government of modern Greece had defaulted in 1826, 
1843 and 1860. The first Greek bankruptcy occurred in 1826 (four years before the Greek state was declared) and 
was caused by the inability to reimburse interests on British loans granted for the War of Greek Independence 
(1821–1832) against the Ottoman Empire (Levandis, 1944). 
26  As a result, the crisis led to massive migration. Between 1906 and 1914, about 250.000 broke Greek raisins 
growers migrated to the United States (Campbell and Sherrard, 1968, p. 97). 
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To solve the crisis, the Greek government searched for new export markets and tried to regulate 
the supply of raisins in order to stabilize falling prices. First, Greece tried to export more raisins 
to Britain, its traditional exporting market but Spain and Turkey already occupied the remaining 
market shares (see Table 3). Second, Greece tried to export Greek raisins to other countries 
such as Holland, Germany and Russia. In Russia, this was temporarily successful as Russia 
increased consumption from 1,000 tons to 30,000 tons in 1895 but the solution was short lived 
as Russia soon also imposed high import tariffs on Greek raisins (Gabrielidis, 1895).27 Greek 
raisin exports to Holland and Germany were more successful as they doubled their exports from 
12,000 tons in the 1884–91 period to 26,000 tons in the 1893–1900 period. However, the 
northern European markets never managed to substitute for the reduction in French demand 
(which averaged 46,000 tons in the 1884–91 period) (see Figure 6).  
Third, from 1895, the Greek government imposed a “withholding” (storage) of raisins 
of 15% of the quantities exported.28 Through the “withholding”, part of the raisin production 
was stored and kept for internal consumption or burned through distillation.29 In addition, from 
1899 to 1904, the Raisin Bank was established and directly managed the “withholding” of 
raisins (Aroni‐Tsichli, 2014; Lampe and Jackson, 1982, p. 179; Petmezas, 1997; Progoulakis 
and Bournova, 2001; Tsiovaridou, 1980). 
The various measures helped to stop the fall in raisin prices. Prices somewhat recovered 
from 0.1 francs per kilograms in 1894 to 0.5 francs per kilograms in 1897 (Tsiovaridou, 1980). 
                                                          
27 Part of the demand came from raisin consumption by Russian Jews. For religious reasons, by the 19th century, 
Jews started to use unfermented raisin wine during the holiday of Passover (Sarna, 1988). 
28 Gabrielidis (1895) notes that (at that time) famous economists—as Professor Sidgwick (Cambridge University) 
and Mr. J. N. Keynes—agreed with the policies implemented at that time in Greece and claimed that “it very 
possible that the proposed retainment might prove temporarily effective in ameliorating the position of the currant-
growers”. 
29 Even if the “withholding” was initially perceived as a temporary measure, the system lasted until 1937 
(Petmezas, 1997).  
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However, the storage regulations created a great divergence between produced and exported 
quantities: raisin production exceeded raisin consumption approximately by 30% (Frangakis-
Syrett, 1994).30 Moreover, the importance of raisins exports in total exports in Greece had 
drastically reduced. Still, in 1902, raisin exports represented about 30% of total Greek export 
value (see Table 4 and Figure 5) and accounted for more than two-thirds of the world’s trade in 
raisins (Pinilla and Ayuda, 2009).  
7. The Dynamic Regulatory Legacy of Standards 
 “No beverage may be kept or transported for sale, offered for sale or sold under the name of 
wine unless it derives exclusively from the alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes or of the 
juice of fresh grapes.”31 
Journal Officiel de la République Française (JORF), 1907 
Today Greece produces around 57,000 tons of raisins and is still the largest producer in the 
European Union (EU).32 However, the main legacy of the rise and fall of the Greek raisin 
exports to France is probably not in Greece’s raisin production, but in the EU’s wine 
regulations. 
As we explained above, growing raisin imports with the recovery of French wine 
production caused political pressures on the French government to intervene and ultimately led 
to several wine regulations. The “adulterations” of French wine which were temporarily 
allowed in times of crises, i.e. the production of wine from raisins or the addition of water and 
sugar, were forbidden in the 1890s under new wine “quality” regulations. After the various 
                                                          
30 These measures might have been an incentive for higher raisin yields. As with wine distillation and storage 
measures implemented in France, and later on in the EU, these measures might have not been effective at solving 
the problems and may have caused—rather than resolved—some major distortions (Meloni and Swinnen, 2013). 
31 Translation by the authors. “Aucune boisson ne peut être détenue ou transportée en vue de la vente, mise en 
vente ou vendue sous le nom de vin que si elle provient exclusivement de la fermentation alcoolique du raisin frais 
ou du jus de raisin frais” (Article 1, JORF, 1907b). 
32 World’s top raisins producers are Turkey (with 380,000 tons) and the United States (with 340,000 tons) (FAO, 
2016). 
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regulations from 1889–1894 which effectively banned “raisin wines”, in 1897, also the 
production of “sugar wines” and “grape marc wines” was banned.33 Finally, the 1889 French 
law (‘Loi Griffe’) was confirmed in 1907 and defined “wine” as a beverage exclusively made 
from the “alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes or of the juice of fresh grapes” (JORF, 1907b; 
Lachiver, 1988, p. 476/7; Phillips, 2016, p. 189; Unwin, 1991, p. 313). 
These French regulations ultimately became the cornerstone of the EU wine policy.34 
As we explain in Meloni and Swinnen (2013, 2014), economic integration in the European 
Economic Community (EEC) during the 1960s and 1970s required the integration of different 
policy regimes in one EEC wine policy (the Common Market Organization (CMO) for wine). 
The two main wine countries among the original EEC member states were France and Italy. 
While France’s wine market was highly regulated through government intervention, including 
strict rules on “quality wine” production (as the Appellations of Origin), Italy had more liberal 
wine policies. After long and difficult negotiations, the European Common Wine Policy (CWP) 
was agreed in 1970 and introduced restrictions on winemaking for the entire EEC.  
The outcome of this negotiation was written in Annex II of the Council Regulation 
(EEC) No. 816/70 where “wine” was defined as “the product obtained exclusively from the 
total or partial alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes, whether or not crushed, or of grape 
musts”—thereby excluding the production of wine from raisins.35 Hence, the French standards 
                                                          
33 “La fabrication et la circulation en vue de la vente des vins de marc et des vins de sucre sont interdites” (Article 
3, JORF, 1897). Before, their production was allowed but had to be declared to the tax department. 
34 See Table 5 for a chronology of the introduction of wine “quality” regulations in France and in the EU. 
35 There is a notable exception in the EU, the case of “partially” raisined wines (such as late harvest wines or 
dessert wines). These “partially” raisined wines (“Passiti” in Italian or “Vin de Paille” in French) are produced 
using the same techniques used for producing “raisin wines”, i.e. harvests are postponed and grapes are dried 
naturally by the sun (either directly on the vine or on straw mats) before fermentation. The main two differences 
are: a) the dried grapes retain some water, and the addition of extra water on the raisins to start the fermentation is 
not needed (as for the production of “raisin wines”); b) the entire winemaking process (and risks) is carried on by 
the wine producer (which is also a “wine grower” and not just a “raisin importer”). Therefore, due to the low yields 
and labor-intensive production method, the wines obtained are usually sweet, strong and expensive wines. The 
most famous European examples are the French Sauternes white wines (in Bordeaux), the Tokaj sweet white wines 
(in Hungary) and the Amarone dry red wine (in Italy) (Ribéreau-Gayon et al., 2006, p. 449).  
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now became European standards. With expansion of the EEC to the EU-28, these standards 
now regulate 60% of the world’s wine production (see e.g. Meloni and Swinnen, 2016b).36 
8. Conclusion 
The rise and fall of the raisin trade between France and Greece in the course of 25 years at the 
end of the 19th century is a dramatic example of how major changes in trade can be caused by 
standards and tariffs in addition to comparative advantages and environmental shocks, and of 
its important implications for trade, economic growth and decline. Between 1875 and 1890 
raisin exports from Greece and France grew from close to zero to very high levels. By the 1900 
they had fallen back to almost zero. Tariffs and standards played an important role in this. 
The arrival of Phylloxera in the mid-19th century in France devastated French vineyards 
and caused a demand for substitutes, such as the production of “adulterated wines” including 
those made from fermenting imported raisins. Greece expanded its vine plantings in response 
to French demand for grapes and wine and Greek raisin exports tripled between 1870 and 1890.  
However, when France found a way to deal with the infestation, its domestic grape 
production recovered, and, under pressure from its wine growers, the government introduced 
several radical measures that made it more difficult to use imported raisins. It forbade the use 
of Greek raisins to make French wine, it raised taxes on “adulterated wines”, it increased import 
tariffs on raisins, and defined wine as “the alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes”. When these 
prove insufficient to protect domestic producer interests, it further tightened the standards by 
forbidding the addition of water to wine. The French regulations destroyed the raisin trade. 
Moreover, as raisins had become the main export revenue for Greece and an important tax 
                                                          
36 For a more detailed analysis on regulatory coherence in global wine regulation see Waye (2016). 
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source for the government budget, these regulations contributed to the bankruptcy of the Greek 
government. 
This dramatic historical case illustrates how product standards can be used to address 
consumer concerns or to protect producer interests, or both. While the wine regulations reduced 
information asymmetry for consumers by imposing labeling of “adulterated wine” (including 
wine produced from raisins), the regulations had a strong impact in protecting French grape and 
traditional wine producers against their competitors. The political analysis also clearly shows 
that they were the main lobby group demanding the introduction of the regulations. 
Interestingly, the case also provides an illustration of the dynamic political economy 
aspects of standards (Swinnen, 2017). The trade and policy changes of more than a century ago 
still have a regulatory legacy in today’s EU wine regulations, which still define “wine” as the 
product obtained exclusively from the fermentation of fresh grapes (or grape musts), excluding 
the production of wine from raisins. This case illustrates how, once a standards is introduced, 
it is difficult to remove it as regulations induce producers to adapt their investments and 
strategies and possibly affect consumer preferences and thus create more vested interests in 
maintaining it. The expansion of the EU has not caused a mitigation or removal of the 
regulations, to the contrary, an expansion of the regulation across a much wider geographic 
region. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1  
The Production of “Adulterated Wines” in France, 1878–1902 
 
 Total wine 
production 
(including 
“adulterated wines”) 
Total production of 
“adulterated wines”* 
 Production of “raisin 
wines” 
 
 Million hl % of total 
production 
  Million hl % total 
production 
 
1878 49.6 0.9 1.8 0.9 1.8 
1879 27.3 1.5 5.6 1.5 5.6 
1880 31.5 1.9 5.9 1.9 5.9 
1881 38.6 4.5 11.5 2.3 6.0 
1882 35.1 4.2 12.0 2.5 7.1 
1883 39.8 3.7 9.4 2.9 6.7 
1884 37.7 2.9 7.7 1.6 4.3 
1885 33.3 4.8 14.3 2.3 6.8 
1886 32.9 7.8 23.8 2.8 8.5 
1887 32.7 8.4 25.6 2.6 8.0 
1888 38.3 8.2 21.5 2.2 5.8 
1889 28.3 5.1 18.0 1.8 6.4 
1890 36.5 9.1 24.9 4.3 11.8 
1891 36.8 6.6 18.0 1.7 4.7 
1892 33.7 5.6 16.6 1.1 3.1 
1893 53.8 3.7 6.9 0.8 1.6 
1894 42.7 3.6 8.4 0.5 1.2 
1895 31.4 4.7 14.9 0.8 2.4 
1896 50.7 5.9 11.8 0.9 1.8 
1897 38.0 5.7 14.9 0.5 1.2 
1898 39.4 7.2 18.1 0.1 0.3 
1899 56.1 8.2 14.6 0.1 0.2 
1900 71.6 4.3 6.0 0.09 0.1 
1901 59.5 1.6 2.6 0.04 0.1 
1902 42.6 2.8 6.4 0.01 0.0 
* Note: “Adulterated wines” here included “raisin wines” (wines produced from raisins), 
“sugar wines” (obtained either from the addition of sugar to the wine or from the addition 
of water and sugar to the grape marcs) and “grape marc wines” (or “piquettes” obtained 
from the addition of only water to the grape marcs). It does not include wines with 
unhealthy ingredients. 
Source: Galet (1964, pp.30–31) and authors’ calculations. 
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Table 2 
Greek Raisin Exports by Major Importing Countries, 1878–1893  
 
 Greek raisin exports to 
Britain 
 Greek raisin exports 
to France 
Total Greek 
raisin exports 
1000 tons % of total 1000 tons % total 1000 tons 
   exports   exports  
1878 62.5 62 9.2 9 101.3 
1879 57.7 60 19.3 20 96.2 
1880 58.7 63 21.3 23 93.2 
1881 70.5 57 30.6 25 123.2 
1882 61.8 56 29.6 27 110.5 
1883 65.1 56 25.1 22 116.1 
1884 71.9 55 39.6 30 130.5 
1885 58.9 51 38.1 33 114.4 
1886 54.8 43 45.4 35 128.8 
1887 57.9 44 37.8 28 134.1 
1888 64.7 48 33.9 25 136.9 
1889 53.1 32 71.1 43 166.3 
1890 68.6 48 45.1 31 143.8 
1891 71.9 40 53.8 30 180.4 
1892 61.4 51 18.8 16 121.4 
1893 72.7 52 14.6 10 140.9 
Source: Tsiovaridou (1980) and authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Greek, Spanish and Turkish Raisin Exports by Major Importing Countries, 1871–1911 
 
 Britain France 
 Greece  Spain and Turkey Greece Spain and Turkey 
 1000 
tons 
%   1000 tons % 1000 tons % 1000 tons % 
1871-77 - -  - - 0.1 0.9 10.6 99.1 
1878-82 62.2 72.2  23.9 27.8 22.0 37.6 36.5 62.4 
1883-87 61.7 69.4  27.2 30.6 37.2 43.4 48.6 56.6 
1888-92 63.9 59.6  27.9 30.4 44.5 60.1 29.6 39.9 
1893 72.7 73.4  26.4 26.6 14.6 36.0 26.0 64.0 
1911 67.1 66.6  33.6 33.4 - - - - 
     Sources: Petmezas (1997) and Tsiovaridou (1980). 
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Table 4 
The Importance of Raisin Exports in Total Exports in Greece, 1860–1902 
 
 1860 1871 1881 1888 1902 
Cultivated vine area (in thousand ha) 15 23 41 53 70 
Raisin production (in thousand tons) 52 82 123 156 154 
Value of raisin exports, deflated (in thousand drachmas) 23,1 33,9 59,7 69,2 23,8 
Raisin exports over the value of total exports (in %) 52,5 48,7 68,8 55,7 28,9 
Sources: Franghiadis (1990, p. 27); Petmezas (1997, p. 325); Pizánias (1988, pp. 128–133). 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Introduction of Wine “Quality” Regulations in France and in the EU 
 
 Introduced in France Introduced in the EU 
Definition of wine* 1889 (Loi Griffe)/1907 1970 
Ban on additives** 1891 1970 
Ban on the addition of alcohol and water  1894 1970 
Ban on “sugar wines” and “marc wines” 1897/1905/1907 1970*** 
Quality policy (GIs)**** 1908/1919/1927/1935 1970 
Notes:  
* Wine has to be made from the “fermentation of fresh grapes”. 
** Some harmful additives used during winemaking were banned, such as sulfuric, nitric, hydrochloric, 
salicylic, boric acids or sodium chloride. 
*** “Chaptalization” (the addition of sugar to wine must to increase the wine alcoholic strength) was 
(and is still) allowed under certain conditions and in certain regions. 
**** The creation of a French wine “quality” policy was achieved in thirty years, through the 
implementation of successive (and stricter) laws. In 1935, the final law created the Appellations 
d’Origine Contrôlées (AOC)—which formed the basis for the later EU quality regimes.  
Sources: Meloni and Swinnen (2013, 2014, 2016); JORF (1889, 1891, 1894, 1897, 1905, 1907a, 1907b); 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 816/70.  
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Figures 
Figure 1 
Greek Raisin Exports and French Production of “Raisin Wines”, 1870–1905 
(in thousand tons) 
 
 
Sources: Galet (1964, pp. 30–31); Pizánias (1988, pp. 136–139). 
 
 
Figure 2 
The Production of ‘Adulterated’ Wines in France, 1878–1928 (in million hectoliters) 
 
 
* Note: “Adulterated” wines included “raisin wines” (wines produced from raisins), “sugar wines” 
(obtained either from the addition of sugar to the wine or from the addition of water and sugar to the 
grape marcs) and “grape marc wines” (or “piquettes” obtained from the addition of only water to the 
grape marcs). 
Source: Galet (1964, pp. 30–31). 
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Figure 3 
Raisin Production and Exports in Greece, 1830–1912 (in thousand tons) 
 
 
Source: Pizánias (1988, pp. 128–133). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4 
GDP-Deflated Raisin and Total Value Exports in Greece, 1857–1912 (in million 
drachmas) 
 
 
Sources: Pizánias (1988, pp. 128–133); GDP deflator (1914 = 100) from Lazaretou (2014). 
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Figure 5 
Raisin Value Exports as Percentage of Total Value Exports in Greece, 1857–1912  
 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Pizánias (1988, pp. 128–133). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
Greek Raisin Exports by Major Importing Countries, 1857–1912 (in thousand tons) 
 
 
Source: Pizánias (1988, pp. 136–139).  
 
 
 
